Should the Model Penal Code’s
Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?
Kenneth W. Simons*
I. INTRODUCTION
Do the Model Penal Code’s (MPC) provisions on mental states need revision?
The question might seem preposterous. After all, many believe that these
provisions count as the MPC’s greatest achievement: they clarify and simplify
mental state categories, and replace an undifferentiated focus on the mens rea of an
offense with a more careful focus on the mens rea for each element of an offense.
The drafters of the MPC indeed have much to be proud of here. Prior to the
MPC, the prevailing mental state categories included general intent and specific
intent, malice aforethought, and other concepts that were just as confusing. And in
many states, these confusing and infinitely manipulable old concepts are still with
us. Consider one well-known recent case. In Commonwealth v. Woodward, a
nanny was charged with murder for allegedly violently shaking a baby and
slamming him against the floor, resulting in his death. The judge instructed the
jury that, to decide whether she acted with “malice,” they should determine
“whether, under the circumstances known to Defendant, a reasonable person would
have known that her intentional act created a substantial risk of death to [the
victim].”1 Notice that this sounds like a narrow criterion, insofar as it requires
proof of the most culpable mens rea criteria—“intentionally” and “known.” Yet
the most important part of the criterion (“a reasonable person would have known”)
requires only ordinary negligence. And, taken literally, the criterion is quite easy
to satisfy: it would permit a murder conviction for a beginning driver who
“intentionally” switches lanes, “knowing” that he is on a busy highway, but
negligently fails to check his blind spot and causes a fatal collision.
Nevertheless, in this essay I will suggest that the MPC did lose something in
departing from more traditional mens rea criteria. Furthermore, the MPC approach
creates new problems, some rather significant. So a fine-tuning of the MPC
approach, at least, would be worthwhile.
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Commonwealth v. Woodward, 7 Mass. 449 (1997), aff’d and remanded by 694 N.E.2d 1277
(Mass. 1998).

179

180

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 1:179

To be sure, the problems with the MPC’s culpability provisions are not so
severe that they alone would justify the enormous effort of developing a revised
Model Penal Code Second. But if such an effort is undertaken, serious thought
should be given to the matters identified in this essay.
The essay proceeds as follows. First, it emphasizes that the MPC approach to
mens rea was a tremendous advance. The MPC carefully defines a limited number
of mens rea terms, firmly establishes element analysis in place of offense analysis,
and recognizes that the doctrine of mistake is part and parcel of the basic analysis
of mens rea.
However, a revised Code could improve the drafting of the mens rea
provisions in a number of respects. Moreover, more fundamental questions arise
with the central concept of recklessness. A reckless actor is one who must be
aware of a “substantial and unjustifiable” risk; are these independent or
interdependent requirements? What type or degree of consciousness is required?
Of what, precisely, must the actor be aware? Does a strict “consciousness”
requirement undermine the rule that ignorance of law is no excuse? And should
consciousness extend to “latent” knowledge that the actor could call up if he were
to consider the matter even for a moment?
Furthermore, does the MPC hierarchy always work? Is knowledge really
always worse than recklessness? Is recklessness always worse than negligence?
Should culpable indifference or a similar mental state be added to the hierarchy?
Are the MPC categories too cognitive, or too descriptive, or too rigid? Finally, the
conclusion examines some theoretical and pragmatic implications of the analysis.
II. THE MODEL PENAL CODE’S ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Let me start with a reminder of what the MPC did accomplish in this area.
The MPC’s approach to mental states or culpability terms was a tremendous
advance, in four important ways:
•

The MPC limits the number of mens rea terms to four—purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence—plus strict liability.2

•

The MPC’s definitions of mens rea terms are much clearer than are
traditional definitions, which often are not spelled out in the governing
legislation at all. In particular, the MPC’s definitions of recklessness and
negligence are not nearly as vague as the criteria that many traditional
jurisdictions employ.3

2
However, the MPC also recognizes the more traditional mens rea category, “extreme
indifference,” as one type of murder. The drafters’ decision to depart from the new, simplified
hierarchy, especially in the context of the most serious crime, murder, demonstrates a genuine and
significant difficulty with that hierarchy. See infra notes 55–56.
3
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 238 (1985) [hereinafter MPC Commentaries] (the
new recklessness definition avoids “essentially epithetical” traditional language).
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•

The MPC firmly establishes the idea of element analysis in place of
“offense analysis.” A single crime can employ different mens rea criteria
for different elements (and the relevant elements for which mens rea can
vary include justifications such as self-defense as well as elements of the
prima facie case).

•

The MPC recognizes that mistake is not a separate doctrine, but part and
parcel of the basic analysis of mens rea. Figuring out which mistakes and
which cases of ignorance will result in nonliability is just a question of
“logical relevance”: Does the mistake or ignorance negate the required
mens rea or not?4

Other contributions of the MPC are also noteworthy: clarifying the
subjective/objective distinction, at least to some extent;5 adding some helpful
interpretive principles;6 and attempting to clarify when mistake or ignorance of law
is a defense.7
Nevertheless, the Code’s provisions do create some problems. A first group
of problems could be described as internal and more technical—that is, as
problems with the implementation of the general “element analysis” approach. A
second group of problems is more fundamental. What does the critical mental
state of “recklessness” really require? What type of “consciousness” is required,
and precisely what facts must the actor advert to?
Is the Code’s
purpose/knowledge/recklessness/negligence hierarchy complete, or is it missing
something? And are “higher” mental states within the hierarchy always more
culpable than “lower” mental states?

4

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1) (1985); MPC Commentaries, supra note 3, at 269.
Purpose and knowledge are entirely on the subjective side, focusing completely on the
individual actor’s state of mind; negligence is almost entirely on the objective side, focusing on the
actor’s failure to be aware of a risk and gross deviation from reasonable care; and recklessness is
somewhere in between, with a purely subjective focus on consciousness of risk but also the same
objective “gross deviation” standard that the negligence test provides.
6
If a statute contains no explicit mens rea terms, the default mens rea for all material elements
is recklessness. If the statute contains a mens rea term that clearly applies to several elements—for
example, if the adverb “purposely” or “knowingly” precedes “causes the death of a police officer” or
“receives stolen property”—then that initial term “travels” through the several elements, applying to
all. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (1985). I dub this the “travel” rule. Markus Dubber calls it “onefor-all.” MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 54 (2002).
7
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1) (1985) (treating certain mistakes of law as mistakes of
fact); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) (1985) (requiring no culpability as to most mistakes of
governing law, with limited exceptions). This attempt does not quite succeed, however. See infra
notes 17–21 and accompanying text.
5
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III. INTERNAL PROBLEMS
The Code’s element analysis is a bit too complicated, and sometimes
imprecise. Here are a number of queries and suggestions for improvements.
A. Clarify how to distinguish result, circumstance, and conduct elements from
one another
The distinction between these three types of offense elements matters for the
definitions of purpose and knowledge, for characterizing the required mens rea of
inchoate crimes such as attempt, and in some other situations. Yet the MPC never
explicitly differentiates them. Paul Robinson, among others, has offered some
plausible criteria.8
B. Perhaps simplify the definitions of knowledge and purpose
“Knowledge” could be given the same meaning, whether it applies to a
circumstance or result element; and “purpose” could be simplified in a similar
manner. (An incidental benefit of this change is that the distinction between
circumstance and result would less often matter.)
Thus, with respect to knowledge, is it really worth distinguishing a belief that
a result is “practically certain” from a belief that a circumstance is “highly
probable”?9 Why not use “practically certain,” “highly probable” or a similar term
in both instances? And, with respect to purpose, would it not suffice to define
“purpose” with respect to results, and then simply provide that when “purposely”
applies to a circumstance element, it means “knowledge”?10

8

See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The
Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 719–24 (1983); Paul H. Robinson, Rethinking
Federal Criminal Law: Reforming the Federal Criminal Code: A Top Ten List, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 225, 235–39 (1997); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 111–12 (3d
ed. 2001); Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 535 n.250 (1992)
(suggesting a slight variation on Robinson’s approach).
9
See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(b)(ii), 2.02(7) (1985). Indeed, the Code’s definition of
knowledge as to a circumstance must be derived from two sources: the basic definition, “aware that
such circumstances exist,” in § 2.02(2)(b)(i); and “aware of a high probability of its existence,” in
§ 2.02(7). The latter phrase presumably controls the former, since it is a weaker requirement. To be
sure, the “high probability” language is followed by a qualifying clause, but this clause creates its
own set of problems. See infra Part III(F).
10
This approach would differ from the Code’s mainly in dropping the Code’s provision that
“purpose” as to a circumstance is satisfied either by belief or by “hope” that the circumstance exists.
But I have not found any reported case relying on the “hope” provision alone, and it is also doubtful
whether a bare desire that an illicit fact exist is a proper basis of criminal punishment. Read literally,
the Code’s “hope” provision allows conviction of a defendant who merely desires that unlawful
circumstances exist, even if he is confident that it does not exist and would not act differently even if
he thought it did. See Kenneth W. Simons, Does Punishment for “Culpable Indifference” Simply

2003]

SHOULD MENS REA PROVISIONS BE AMENDED?

183

It also might be worthwhile to specify what “high probability” and “practical
certainty” mean. How high a likelihood? Is greater than 50% enough for “high
probability”?11 Does “practical certainty” mean close to 100%? Or is, say, 80% a
high enough probability here? Even if we are uncomfortable employing a precise
number, greater clarity would be valuable.12 (Some states that have adopted
versions of the MPC definitions of knowledge have used different language, such
as “reasonably certain,”13 but these versions, too, are often imprecise.14)
C. Perhaps eliminate the category of “mens rea as to conduct”
It is normally unduly confusing, and not analytically helpful, to retain this
category. As Paul Robinson has argued, the typical case in which we are worried
about culpability as to one’s own conduct (as opposed to culpability as to the result
of one’s conduct, or as to a circumstance) is where we have doubts about the
voluntariness of the conduct.15 The voluntary act requirement is usually sufficient
to address this difficulty. For example, if burglary requires “entering” the dwelling
of another, it is rarely helpful to ask whether the actor is “negligent,” “reckless,” or
“knowing” as to whether he is “entering” the building. If someone throws him into

Punish for “Bad Character”? Examining the Requisite Connection between Mens Rea and Actus
Reus, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 219, 239 (2002).
11
The Commentaries contain a hint that a “high” probability is meant to be considerably more
than a 50% probability. They describe as “more expansive” than the MPC position the definition in
Ohio’s code that knowledge is satisfied when the result or circumstance is “probable.” MPC
Commentaries, supra note 3, at 248 n.43.
12
See Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 983
n.105 (1998); Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea,
81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY. 191, 223–24 (1990). Insofar as jurors have difficulty understanding
percentages, an instruction could include an equivalent paraphrase.
13
TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(b) (1994) (defining knowledge as to a result element). Moreover,
Washington defines knowledge as including not only awareness, but also possession of “information
which would lead a reasonable man in the same situation to believe” that an offense element exists.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii) (2000). This definition makes a certain type of negligence
sufficient for “knowledge”!
14
However, Ohio defines “knowledge” as awareness that one is “probably” causing a result or
that a circumstance “probably” exists. Apparently this means simply “more likely than not”; thus, it
is a precise criterion. 1973 Ohio Legis. Serv. (Banks-Baldwin). On the other hand, Ohio also defines
“reckless” as (among other things) a known risk that the result or circumstance is “likely.” Strangely
enough, “likely” seems to mean, not “more likely than not,” but only that there is good reason for
expectation or belief. Id.
15
See Robinson & Grall, supra note 8, at 721–23; PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW § 4.2
(1997); David M. Treiman, Recklessness and the Model Penal Code, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 281, 310–16
(1981); see also Michael S. Moore, Actus Reus, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 15, 22–24
(Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002).
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the building, he lacks any culpable state of mind as to the conduct element
“entering,” but he also hasn’t acted voluntarily.16
D. Clarify the fact/law distinction, and especially the distinction between two
types of mistakes of law—mistakes of governing law and mistakes of legal
element—that the MPC treats differently
Consider a crime such as “knowingly receiving stolen property.” Is the
defendant guilty if he makes a mistake about whether the property is, in law as
well as fact, “stolen”? For example, suppose he realizes that the person from
whom he received the property took it from someone’s garbage bin on private
property, and he believes incorrectly that such property does not count as “stolen”
because he believes, again incorrectly, that under these circumstances, the property
no longer belongs to the original owner.
If this type of mistake is considered a mistake of governing law—namely, a
mistake “as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to meaning . . . or
application of the law determining the elements of an offense”17—then no mens
rea will be required (with very rare exceptions). But if it is considered a mistake
of legal element, under § 2.04(1), then it would be treated like mistake of fact, and
could exculpate if the mistake demonstrates that the actor lacks the culpability
required for the crime.18
When the mistake of legal element is a mistake as to a legal category defined
elsewhere in the jurisdiction’s law—especially its civil law—then the “legal
element” label fits most easily. (Suppose “stolen property” is defined in the
commercial code of the jurisdiction.) But what if the definition comes from
elsewhere in the state’s criminal code?19 Or even from judicial opinions
16
Sometimes, the characteristics of one’s conduct are appropriately treated as a circumstance
element, to which any of the MPC’s mens rea terms can apply. For example, if it is a crime to insult
another in a manner likely to provoke violence, then “[u]nder a narrow view of the conduct element,
the required conduct is the simple act of speaking. The conduct’s characteristics—its insulting
character, its likelihood of promoting a violent response—would be treated as circumstance or result
elements.” ROBINSON, supra note 15, at 235 (1997); Robinson, supra note 8, at 238.
17
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(9) (1985).
18
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1)(a) (1985): “Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or
law is a defense if . . . the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief,
recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense.” (emphasis added).
The Commentaries use the example of a (traditional) rape statute in which the actor mistakenly
believes that a woman is his wife. If his mistake concerns eligibility to marry, then, the
Commentaries conclude, it does not matter whether this mistake is considered one of law or fact. See
MPC Commentaries, supra note 3, at 270; see also id. at 250 (suggesting that the “ignorance of law
is no defense” principle is “greatly overstated” because the circumstances made material by the
definition of an offense frequently include a legal element).
19
See, e.g., People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1068 (N.Y. 1987); cf. People v. Bray, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 913, 913 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (deriving the relevant definition of “felony” from the criminal
law of another state).
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interpreting the statute in question? (For example, the relevant definition of
“stolen” might come entirely from interpretations of the criminal theft statutes
themselves.) In any case, even in the “easier” case where the definition derives
from the jurisdiction’s civil law, why should this be treated differently from a case
where the definition comes from the criminal code itself? And why should it be
treated differently from a case where the defendant does not know that “knowing
receipt of stolen property” is a crime at all? Or from a case where he does know
that a regulatory offense encompasses certain type of weapons or devices (or
certain types of drugs or products) but does not know that it encompasses others?
In short, the distinction between mistake of governing law and of legal
element is badly in need of clarification.20 And even the distinction between
mistake of law and mistake of fact deserves more careful elucidation.21
E. Clarify the meaning of the “reasonable person” test
In a wide range of contexts, the MPC employs a “reasonable person”
criterion. But the contours of the criterion are often unclear. First of all, how
subjective is it? Which characteristics and capacities of the individual defendant
are taken into account? Should we ask what the reasonable sixteen year-old would
do or believe? The reasonable person in a state of shock? The reasonable hothead? The Code often fudges with the phrase, “[r]easonable person in the actor’s
situation.”22 One can understand the Code’s reluctance to provide a precise rule20

For some discussions of the difficulty of drawing and of justifying the distinction between
mistake of legal element and mistake of governing law, see Gerald Leonard, Rape, Murder, and
Formalism: What Happens if We Define Mistake of Law?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 507 (2001);
DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 173–77; Larry Alexander, Inculpatory and Exculpatory Mistakes and the
Fact/Law Distinction: An Essay in Memory of Myke, 12 LAW & PHIL. 33 (1993); Kenneth W.
Simons, Mistake and Impossibility, Law and Fact, and Culpability: A Speculative Essay, 81 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 447 (1990).
21
See Leonard, supra note 20; Simons, supra note 20.
22
This phrase, or a similar one, occurs in the definitions of recklessness (“standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation,” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c)
(1985)); negligence (“standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s
situation,” § 2.02(2)(d)); extreme emotional disturbance, § 210.3(1)(b) (“extreme emotional
disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse,” where “the reasonableness of such
explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation
under the circumstances as believes them to be.”); and duress, § 2.09 (use or threat of force that “a
person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist”). Moreover, a
number of defenses incorporate negligence and recklessness criteria in the following way: if the actor
makes a mistake in the exercise of a defense, his punishment is sometimes mitigated in proportion to
the culpability of his mistake. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (self-defense); § 3.02(2)(2) (choice
of evils).
The MPC Commentaries acknowledge that by employing this phrase, they create a certain
amount of vagueness, to be clarified by courts or resolved by juries. See MPC Commentaries, supra
note 3, at 242 (describing ambiguity of “in the actor’s situation” in definition of negligence); id.
§ 2.09 at 375 (“situation” should be given same scope as in appraising recklessness and negligence; it
should consider “[s]tark, tangible factors” such as “size, strength, age, or health,” but not “[m]atters
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like criterion here, given the broad and diverse range of fact patterns to which the
criterion must apply. Still, perhaps the Code could at least employ a standard, to
provide some guidance on how subjective the test should be. It might, for
example, adopt a standard along these lines: “The judge or jury may consider the
actor’s personal situation only when this has a just bearing on his culpability.”
A second and related question is this: Does the “reasonable person” test
change its meaning depending on the context? After all, some kind of reasonable
person or reasonableness requirement appears in quite a range of contexts—not
only as part of the prima facie case, but also in defenses; and not only in defenses,
but in defenses of excuse (such as duress or extreme emotional disturbance) as well
as defenses of justification (such as lesser evils or self-defense).23
But how does a “person of reasonable firmness” in duress compare to the
“standard of conduct [observed by] a law-abiding person . . . in the actor’s
situation” in the definition of recklessness?24 The Code, alas, gives little guidance.
In duress, for example, is the point of the “reasonableness” constraint to exclude
the defense from actors who are especially blameworthy (i.e., whose excuse claim
is weak)? From actors who, although not especially blameworthy, have
unjustifiably committed a crime (i.e., whose acts, though excused, are not
justified)? Or is the point, instead, the institutional imperative to avoid the risks of
fraud and error that a broader defense would create, or the consequentialist concern
not to weaken the deterrent efficacy of the criminal law?
Third, is the reasonable person criterion too cognitive? Insofar as the criterion
can apply to result as well as circumstance elements—for example, to negligent
homicide—perhaps the basic definition of negligence should encompass not only
what a reasonable person would believe, but also what he or she would do.25 Thus,

of temperament”); id. § 210.3 at 62–63 (“reasonable explanation or excuse” is flexible, and “[t]he
word ‘situation’ is designedly ambiguous,” incorporating the defendant’s “personal handicaps and
some external characteristics,” but excluding “idiosyncratic personal values”; however, the
Commentators leave open whether “an abnormally fearful temperament” or abnormal sensitivities
may be considered).
23
The MPC’s “extreme emotional disturbance” provision poses a further problem. This
provision is meant to include not only the voluntary manslaughter, “heat of passion” doctrine, but
also cases of mental disability or illness less than insanity in which the offender deserves a partial
excuse, i.e., a conviction of manslaughter rather than murder. But imposing a “reasonableness”
qualification on both categories is extremely confusing, since the mentally disordered defendant
cannot easily be characterized in “reasonable person” terms. By definition, a person with a peculiar
mental disability or disturbance is not a “reasonable person.” For cases revealing the awkwardness of
employing a reasonableness test to encompass both heat of passion and mental disorder, see State v.
Raguseo, 622 A.2d 519 (Conn. 1993) and People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980).
24
The “reasonable person” component of the negligence standard is worded almost identically.
It does not appear that the slight difference in wording was intended to mark a difference in meaning
or scope. MPC Commentaries, supra note 3, at 242 n.27; Treiman, supra note 15, at 348–49.
25
In some iterations, to be sure, the “reasonableness” requirement does focus on action, not
belief. Consider the definitions of duress and extreme emotional distress. See MPC Commentaries,
supra note 22.
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suppose a highly unskilled driver or surgeon causes an accident. Her fault might
consist in departing greatly from the standard that a reasonable person would
satisfy, and not, or not merely, in her failing to be aware of a substantial risk posed
by her driving or by her surgical technique. (No doubt she is perfectly well aware
that if she fails to react promptly to other drivers, or fails to keep a steady hand,
she will pose a substantial risk of injury to others.26) In short, not all negligence
involves perceptual difficulties, or even failures to make reasonable inferences
from perceptions; yet the MPC criterion is limited to such cases.
F. Clarify the definition of willful blindness, in subsection (7)
The MPC’s version of the willful blindness doctrine is as follows: “When
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such
knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence,
unless he actually believes that it does not exist.” This provision raises a number
of questions.
First, as noted above, the meaning of a “high” probability is unclear; although
this must describe a greater risk than the “substantial” risk that the lesser mental
state of recklessness requires, how much greater must the risk be? And how does
it compare to the definition of knowledge as to a result, “practical certainty”?
Second, if “high probability” is greater than 50%, then the definition as a
whole appears to be incoherent. For the last clause that follows—“unless the actor
actually believes that the fact does not exist”—would seemingly never apply. How
can you actually believe that a fact does not exist, when you know that more likely
than not, it does exist? Thus, suppose an actor is charged with knowingly
transporting drugs, because she agrees to carry a suspicious package from a known
drug supplier to another person for a large fee. How can she both think it likely
that the package contains drugs, but also believe that it does not?
Third, this definition also does not further the supposed policy behind willful
blindness—namely, to treat a reckless actor as harshly as a knowing actor in those
cases where the reckless actor lacks knowledge only for a culpable reason. To be
sure, there is a serious question whether a willful blindness approach to knowledge
is ever justifiable, for it risks watering down the knowledge standard in too many
cases. Absent a clear and defensible criterion of willful blindness, the approach
could, in every case, permit a jury to find that defendant “knew” that a
circumstance existed based simply on the defendant’s recklessness as to the
circumstance. But if the MPC means to adopt some version of the willful
blindness approach, this provision is inartfully drafted.

26

See Kenneth W. Simons, Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law, 3
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 283, 295–97 (2002).
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A revision of the Model Penal Code should consider these problems, among
others.27 But now it is time to consider some difficulties posed by the MPC
approach that are more fundamental.
IV. RECKLESSNESS
The MPC’s recklessness criterion is a laudable attempt to identify and clarify
the minimum culpability presumptively required for criminal liability. It is a much
more precise criterion than the common law “general intent” standard that it more
or less replaces.28 And, as the default mens rea when the legislature didn’t
otherwise specify the mens rea for an offense element, it is a more stringent mens
rea criterion than general intent (as most jurisdictions would interpret the latter
term).
The commitment to use recklessness as the default criterion was a bold
substantive decision, which could have significantly restricted criminal liability
relative to the common law position. As it turns out, however, many states that
adopted the MPC did not agree to use it as a default.29 Still, the MPC’s decision to
make recklessness the default mental state is important as a matter of principle.
For it expresses the classic liberal idea that moral culpability is, and criminal
liability should be, based on a conscious choice to do wrong.
However, the MPC’s recklessness criterion raises a number of significant
problems.

27

It would also be worth clarifying the default mens rea that applies to differences in the grade
of offenses—for example, the quantity of drugs possessed. If liability depends on knowingly
possessing an illegal drug, must one also know the amount or weight (within some range), if this fact
significantly affects the punishment? (The New York Court of Appeals said “yes,” but the legislature
responded by rejecting this interpretation. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.20(4); People v. Ryan, 626
N.E.2d 51, 54 (N.Y. 1993)). For discussion, see Peter W. Low, The Model Penal Code, the Common
Law, and Mistakes of Fact: Recklessness, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 546
(1988) and Richard Singer, The Model Penal Code and Three Two (Possibly Only One) Ways Courts
Avoid Mens Rea, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 139, 190–95 (2000).
Moreover, the MPC’s current mistake of fact provision, § 2.04, apparently has been
misunderstood; in some states, the MPC’s “logical relevance” approach has been undermined by
inconsistent separate “mistake of fact” provisions that simply require that the mistake be “reasonable”
(thus ignoring the MPC’s distinction between negligent and reckless mistakes). Perhaps a revised
MPC should omit the separate § 2.04(1) provision entirely. At the very least, the “logical relevance”
approach needs to be explained more clearly. See Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal
Code’s Culpability Provisions on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including
Abolishing the Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 229 (1997).
28
For a valiant effort to articulate the criteria of general and specific intent, see DRESSLER,
supra note 8, at 135–37.
29
See MPC Commentaries, supra note 3, at 244–45 n.36; see also Holley, supra note 27, at
243–44 (noting that many states that have adopted the MPC model have no default; eleven follow the
MPC in using recklessness as the default; six use negligence as the default; however, one uses the
more stringent mental state of knowledge as the default).
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A. Awareness of a “substantial and unjustifiable” risk
The requirement that the defendant “consciously disregard a substantial and
unjustifiable risk” is ambiguous. Must he be aware both that the risk is substantial
and that it is unjustifiable?30 Moreover, are these independent requirements, or
does the requisite “substantiality” of the risk also depend on how unjustifiable it
is?31
With respect to the first question, it is fairly clear from the commentary
(though not from the text) that the defendant needs to be aware only that the risk is
substantial, not that it is unjustifiable.32 Indeed, redrafting of the MPC would be
useful to clarify this point.33 The answer to the second question is less obvious,
however. Consider two different possible answers.
1. Substantiality and unjustifiability are independent requirements, and
“substantiality” is an invariant threshold requirement
On this view, the actor must be aware of, say, a 5% risk without regard to the
type of harm or the unjustifiability of his conduct. In this sense, recklessness
would be analogous to the MPC’s other cognitive mental state, “knowledge.” Of
course, knowledge is indeed an invariant mental state; when it is required, the actor

30
A related question: Must the actor be aware merely of the facts that make the risk substantial,
or must he also advert directly to the substantiality of the risk? (Similarly, must he be aware merely
of the facts that make the risk unjustifiable, or must he also advert direct to its unjustifiability?) If, in
either case, the first form of awareness suffices, then the recklessness test turns out to be much closer
to a negligence test than one might have imagined.
With respect to consciousness that the risk is substantial, it is very likely that the second form of
awareness is required. See Treiman, supra note 15, at 358. Suppose a speeding driver sees a
pedestrian and says to his passenger “I think I can probably avoid him, but anyway, it’s worth the
risk.” A jury could readily conclude that the driver has consciously adverted to a substantial risk of
hitting him. (However, the driver need not have been aware of the legal term “substantial” so long as
his actual conscious experience constitutes “awareness of a substantial risk.”) On the other hand, it is
implausible to require the second form of awareness in the case of unjustifiability: it should not be a
defense that the actor believes it is justifiable to impose a particular type of risk on another. See
Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Liability, 88 CAL. L. REV.
931, 953 n.62 (2000). But see Joshua Dressler, Does One Mens Rea Fit All?: Thoughts on
Alexander’s Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 955, 959 (2000) (“I would
define recklessness . . . in terms of risk-taking that is substantially or grossly unjustifiable, and I
believe the law should require proof that the actor adverted to its very likely unjustifiability.”).
31
For discussions of this question, see Alexander, supra note 30, at 933–35; Dressler, supra
note 30, at 956–59.
32
Treiman, supra note 15, at 362, 365. Treiman does point out that analysis of the
unjustifiability of the risk, while a largely objective inquiry, contains a subjective component insofar
as it considers the circumstances known to the actor. Id. at 365–67.
33
Some states have adopted a more perspicuous formulation—that recklessness requires the
conscious and unjustifiable disregard of a substantial risk. Id. at 366.
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must be aware of a “high probability” or a “practical certainty,” period, without
regard to any other factors.
If this threshold view is correct, then, in order for an actor to be reckless as to
causing bodily injury to another, he must be aware of at least (say) a 5% risk that
his blow will injure the victim. To be guilty of reckless manslaughter, he must be
aware of at least a 5% risk that he will cause another’s death. And to be guilty of
reckless sale of liquor to a minor, he must be aware of at least a 5% risk that the
buyer is below age.
But suppose we don’t view substantiality and unjustifiability as independent
requirements? In other words, consider a second approach:
2. Substantiality depends on the degree of unjustifiability (and perhaps on
other factors as well)
Perhaps an actor should be guilty of recklessly causing a death even if he is
aware of only a tiny risk of death, less than any threshold “substantiality”
requirement, if the risk is extremely unjustifiable. (Suppose he is drag-racing on
what he reasonably thinks is an abandoned parking lot. Or suppose he shoots a
gun in the air to frighten someone, and his action causes injury or death.34)
Similarly, “substantiality” could vary according to factors other than the
unjustifiability of the conduct. For example, it might vary according to the
seriousness of the harm; thus, a 1% risk of death might count as “substantial,” but
if the relevant harm were merely personal injury, then nothing less than a 10% risk
(of personal injury) would count as “substantial.”35 It is not clear which of these
two options the MPC drafters mean to endorse. In support of the first, the
34

See Alexander, supra note 30, at 934 (posing the example of an extremely low probability
Russian Roulette machine by which defendant deliberately poses a risk of death on an involuntary
victim); Singer, supra note 27, at 193 (posing a similar example).
35
Thus, in People v. Hall, the Court held that whether a risk is “substantial” depends on both
the probability of the risk and the magnitude of the harm if the risk occurs.
Some risks may be substantial even if they carry a low degree of probability
because the magnitude of the harm is potentially great. For example, if a person
holds a revolver with a single bullet in one of the chambers, points the gun at
another's head and pulls the trigger, then the risk of death is substantial even
though the odds that death will result are no better than one in six. . . .
Conversely, a relatively high probability that a very minor harm will occur
probably does not involve a “substantial” risk. Thus, in order to determine
whether a risk is substantial, the court must consider both the likelihood that
harm will occur and the magnitude of potential harm, mindful that a risk may be
"substantial" even if the odds of the harm occurring are lower than fifty percent.
999 P.2d 207, 217–18 (Colo. 2000).
Alexander believes that recklessness should not require awareness of a “substantial” risk. Rather,
he suggests, recklessness should be understood as a sliding scale: knowingly imposing even a tiny
risk can be reckless if the risk is extremely unjustifiable, while knowingly imposing even a
substantial risk can be justifiable. Alexander, supra note 30.
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commentaries speak of the requirement of awareness of a substantial risk,36 but
never speak of any required awareness that the risk is unjustifiable.37 In support of
the second, the commentaries contain one footnote suggesting that substantiality
depends to some extent on justifiability: “[L]ess substantial risks might suffice for
liability if there is no pretense of any justification for running the risk.”38
This problem has been underappreciated. And it is related to another
ambiguity: can an actor be aware of a risk and yet be merely “negligent” (for
purposes of the MPC classification) rather than reckless? Under the first
interpretation, especially, this is a real possibility. For an actor might believe he is
posing only an insubstantial risk. Although the distinction between recklessness
and negligence is almost always treated (in the MPC commentary, in judicial
opinions, and in academic writings) as a distinction between awareness and
inadvertence,39 there is an important third possible category—namely, where an
actor realizes that he is creating some risk, but concludes (either reasonably or
unreasonably) that the risk is tiny and insubstantial. (Imagine a speeding driver
supremely confident that he has the skill to avoid a collision.40) Should such an
actor really be treated as merely negligent, not reckless? Especially if he was
unreasonable in inferring that the risk was insubstantial? Courts in MPC
jurisdictions appear to have reached different conclusions.41
36

MPC Commentaries, supra note 3, at 236, n.13.
One passage is quite ambiguous:
[The jury] is to examine the risk and the factors that are relevant to how
substantial it was and to the justifications for taking it. In each instance, the
question is asked from the point of view of the actor’s perceptions, i.e., to what
extent he was aware of risk, of factors relating to its substantiality and of factors
relating to its unjustifiability.
Id. at 238. Does the last sentence mean that the jury must find some awareness not only of risk, but
of “substantiality” and of “unjustifiability”? If so, how much and what type of awareness?
38
Id. at 237 n.14.
39
See, e.g., id. at 240 (stating flatly that “negligence . . . is distinguished from purposeful,
knowing or reckless action in that it does not involve a state of awareness”).
40
See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 215 (7th ed. 2001).
41
In People v. Strong, defendant claimed (based on past experience) to have special powers
whereby he could stop a person’s heartbeat and then stab the person in the chest without causing
harm. He inserted three knives and a hatchet into the victim’s chest. His “powers” failed him; the
victim died. The New York Court of Appeals held that the jury should have been instructed on
negligent homicide as well as reckless manslaughter, because the jury “could have found that the
defendant failed to perceive the risk inherent in his actions.” 338 N.E.2d 602, 604 (N.Y. 1975). And
in In re William G., the court was persuaded that a youth who mistakenly believed that he had the
skill to ride a shopping cart on two wheels in a busy parking lot without hitting a car lacked conscious
awareness of the risk of damaging the property of another. 963 P.2d 287, 292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
However, in a Texas case, the court upheld a verdict of reckless manslaughter when the victim
challenged defendant to see if she could flip open a knife faster than defendant could draw a loaded
gun. Yates v. State, 624 S.W.2d 817, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The court seems to find irrelevant
whether the defendant thought the risk of death from this “quick-draw” game was minimal.
37
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One possible solution to these difficulties is simply to drop the
“substantiality” requirement from the definition of recklessness: the actor would
need to consciously disregard “a risk,” but not “a substantial risk.” (Of course, the
“unjustifiable” requirement would remain.) This approach might be less precise
than an invariant threshold requirement, but arguably it better serves the twin
policies underlying the MPC’s recklessness criterion—namely, requiring some
awareness of risk while asking the trier of fact to make a broad evaluative
judgment of the actor’s culpability in taking the risk.
B. What does “conscious” disregard mean?
What type or degree of “consciousness” is required? This is a significant
problem for the mens rea of knowledge as well as for recklessness.42
Thus, suppose you know something, or you are aware of a risk, but at the
moment when you cause the harm, you have forgotten what you knew, or you are
distracted?43
And what aspects of the risk must you be “aware” of? Suppose you are
driving and approach a light that has just turned red. And suppose (as is certainly
the case) you are aware that it is risky to run the red light, but you are unaware that
a pedestrian is nearby. Are you reckless as to the risk of injuring or killing him?44
If, to be reckless, you must actually be aware of the presence of the
pedestrian, then quite a few actors who have some awareness of risk won’t be
considered reckless under the MPC.45 But, on the other hand, if it is enough that

I take it for granted that in this third category, where the actor is aware of an insubstantial risk
and satisfies the other requirements of both negligence and recklessness (unjustifiability and gross
deviation), the actor should at least be considered negligent.
42
See Bruce Ledewitz, Mr. Carroll’s Mental State or What is Meant by Intent, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 71 (2001); see also SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER
AND MANSLAUGHTER 166–71 (1998). Moreover, the question whether an actor must be “conscious”
of his actions is also relevant to the threshold determination whether he has committed a voluntary
act. For a thorough recent analysis of this issue, see Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness:
Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269 (2002).
43
If a bank robber forgets that he is carrying a loaded gun with him, is he exculpated from an
aggravated form of bank robbery that requires “knowingly carrying a loaded gun during the course of
the robbery”? This hardly seems like a justifiable excuse. On the other hand, if a parent forgets that
his young child is alone in his car while the parent goes shopping, with the result that the child suffers
harm, does the parent escape liability for recklessly causing that harm? This result seems more
justifiable. But is the distinction between the two cases defensible? On the question of the legal
relevance of forgetting, see Eric Colvin, Recklessness and Criminal Negligence, 32 U. TORONTO L.J.
345, 368–69 (1982); James B. Brady, Recklessness, 15 L. & PHIL. 183, 188–89 (1996).
44
See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 597
(2001).
45
In Ferzan’s terminology, such actors will be merely “opaquely” reckless. See id. Or consider
the straightforward case of a careful driver who swerves to avoid a bicyclist. His only conscious
thought might be “get out of the way of the bike”; nevertheless, it might be reasonable to conclude
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you are aware that a certain kind of conduct is in general pretty risky, then many,
or perhaps most, cases of negligence become cases of recklessness! Suppose you
are distracted while driving because you are talking on your cell phone, or because
you lose your temper, or because you are preoccupied thinking about a lost love.
Are these all reckless acts? For you undoubtedly know that if you become
distracted in one of these ways while driving, you might well cause an accident.
But if these examples count as “recklessness as to resulting harm,” then so do a
wide range of cases in which the actor, although unaware of the specific risk, is
aware that the type of conduct he carelessly engaged in could be dangerous.
This problem is not merely academic. In a Texas case, the defendant was
found guilty of reckless manslaughter for speeding and driving in the opposite
lane, even though she was not actually aware of the presence of the vehicle that she
crashed into, since the collision occurred at the crest of a hill.46 In another Texas
case, the court upheld a verdict for reckless manslaughter despite the possibility
that the defendant fell asleep at the wheel and thus was unaware of the risk of
death in the moments just prior to the accident.47 And in a Colorado case, the court
found sufficient evidence of reckless child abuse for recklessly endangering a child
when defendant crashed into another vehicle that contained several children,
although defendant was not aware of this fact prior to the collision. In the court’s
view:
[T]he awareness required for reckless child abuse is simply
the risk that one’s conduct could result in an injury to a child’s life
or health [citing statute]. Therefore, the risk in this case was not
that children might be in the actual car that Deskins’ vehicle hit
that night. On the contrary, what Deskins consciously disregarded
when he drove while drunk was the risk that children would be
passengers in any of the cars on the road that night.48

that he was aware, at a preconscious level, of the risk that the bicyclist will fall if the driver does not
switch lanes. Id. at 629–30.
Accordingly, Ferzan has suggested that, if an actor is consciously aware merely that her conduct
is dangerous, she can be considered reckless even if she is only preconsciously aware of why her
conduct is dangerous (e.g., because running a red light could kill a pedestrian). Id. at 644.
46
Newman v. State, 49 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. App. 2001).
47
In the court’s words: “The jury could properly apply recklessness to the act of driving
generally, and need not have focused its attention only to the instant before the collision or to whether
or not appellant knew he was across the line.” Porter v. State, 969 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex. App. 1998).
48
People v. Deskins, 927 P.2d 368, 373 (Colo. 1996).
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C. Does a strict “consciousness” requirement undermine the rule that ignorance
of the law is no excuse?
Here is the problem. Suppose the actor gives no thought to the risk, but the
reason he fails to consider the risk is that he has no idea that the law punishes such
an act. For example, suppose a law punishes “knowingly” or “recklessly”
possessing a shotgun of a length less than 18 inches.49 If you don’t even know
there is such a law, you are unlikely to have any conscious beliefs about its
application to your conduct; yet that would mean that ignorance of law would, as a
practical matter, provide you with a defense of lack of mens rea!50
If we continue to hold to the view that ignorance of the law is no excuse, this
is a discomfiting result. For it implies that actors who are diligent enough to
ascertain the legal requirements that govern their actions are more likely to be
guilty than those who are indifferent to those requirements.
D. The problem of “latent” knowledge
Should we employ a counterfactual test, here or in some of the other cases,
and try to discover the actor’s latent beliefs? Perhaps we should ask, “If defendant
gave the matter a moment’s thought, what would he have concluded about the fact,
or about the risk?”51 (If you considered the question of the length of the gun in
your possession even for a moment, you would acknowledge that the gun is less
than a foot long.)
After all, many criminal acts are done quickly or impulsively, without much
self-conscious thought of any sort, much less conscious advertence to risks of
resulting harm. Thus, suppose I get into an argument with you. You insult me.
Instantly, I give you a shove. You stumble and hurt your knee. Am I “conscious
of a substantial risk that I will cause you bodily injury”? Perhaps I gave no
49
See State v. Young, 965 P.2d 37, 45–46 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Jordan, 733 N.E.2d
601, 607 (Ohio 2000) (reasoning that “knowledge” does apply to the element “dangerous ordnance,”
and that the latter, as applied, requires that the shotgun have a barrel less than 18 inches in length; but
concluding that the actor need only “know or be aware of the probability that the item in his
possession is dangerous,” not that the shotgun was shorter than 18 inches).
50
For discussions of this problem, see JOHN CYRIL SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 72
(9th ed. 1999); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 44–48, 154–56, 160–61
(2d ed. 1961); Robert Batey, Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at Common Law and
under the Model Penal Code, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 405–10 (2001); Leonard, supra note 20, at
527–34.
51
See ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 185–86 (3d ed. 1999); Jeremy
Horder, Gross Negligence and Criminal Culpability, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 495, 510–13 (1997);
Kenneth W. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory: the Problem of Criminal Negligence, 5 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 365, 384–85 (1994); see also Alexander, supra note 30, at 953 n.62.
Similarly, if an actor is aware that he has little idea what the risk is, perhaps his uncertain state of
mind is properly characterized as “consciousness of a substantial risk,” at least where he realizes that
the risk could well be substantial. See Treiman, supra note 15, at 324.
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explicit, conscious thought at all to the consequences of my actions. But am I
really no worse than negligent as to the resulting harm?
Similarly, actors often give little or no conscious thought to circumstantial
aspects of their conduct, especially if those aspects don’t affect their basic
intentions and plans. Thus, suppose I’m committing a burglary, entering a
building from the outside, well after dark. I might well give no thought at all to
whether it is day or night. Nevertheless, virtually any sighted person in my shoes
will know that it is dark out, even though he is unlikely to consciously advert to the
question. If burglary requires that the actor be reckless as to the risk that he is
entering a house at nighttime, should I really be exculpated, simply because I’m
not thinking about this circumstance at the time?
One solution is to distinguish between belief and knowledge, on the one hand,
and consciousness and awareness, on the other. At this very moment, I know that
the Earth is round, that I have ten fingers, and that the United States is not at war
with Russia, but it might not be accurate to say that I am conscious or aware of any
of these facts.52 And perhaps the distinctive culpability of recklessness should
require consciousness, not this weaker type of knowledge. On the other hand, it is
doubtful that the MPC meant its definition of knowledge to require less in the way
of consciousness than its definition of recklessness; indeed, the Commentaries
clearly distinguish recklessness from knowledge in terms of how probable the
actor believes the element to be, not in terms of different degrees or types of
consciousness.
Another solution is to recognize certain cases of immediately-accessible latent
knowledge as satisfying criminal law cognitive standards (of both recklessness and
knowledge). Still, by recognizing such cases, we partly eviscerate the line between
subjective and objective, between “adverted” to the risk and “should have been
aware” of the risk. The solution, I suspect, will not be simple.
V. DOES THE MODEL PENAL CODE HIERARCHY ALWAYS WORK?
The MPC views its four basic mental states or culpability terms as
hierarchically ordered: all else being equal, purpose is more culpable than
knowledge, which is more culpable than recklessness, which is more culpable than
negligence. Indeed, the MPC explicitly provides that if a statute requires a mental
state that is lower in the hierarchy, then an actor who possesses a higher mental
state also satisfies that mental state requirement.53

52

See R.A. DUFF, INTENTIONS, ACTIONS, AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY 164–65 (1990); JOHN R.
SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 141–59 (1983); Treiman, supra
note 15, at 354 (distinguishing knowledge from consciousness and belief).
53
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5) (1985).
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But is this hierarchy defensible?54 A first set of questions asks whether
knowledge is always “worse” than recklessness, and whether recklessness is
always “worse” than negligence. A second inquiry is whether the mental state
categories in the hierarchy are excessively cognitive, excessively descriptive, or
too rigidly defined.
A. Is knowledge always worse than recklessness? Is recklessness always worse
than negligence?
Consider, first, whether knowledge is invariably worse than recklessness. In
two recognized doctrinal categories, the answer is “no.” The willful blindness
doctrine essentially provides that some actors who are merely reckless as to a
circumstance element of a crime (such as whether they are transporting drugs)
deserve the same punishment as actors who know that the circumstance exists—
namely, those reckless actors who lack knowledge that the risk is very likely only
because they deliberately avoid such knowledge.55 And the extreme indifference
murder category essentially provides that some actors who are merely reckless as
to the resulting death deserve the same punishment as actors who intend to cause
death or who know that they will very likely cause death—namely, those reckless
actors whose actions and motives display “extreme indifference to the value of
human life” or a “depraved heart.” For example, someone who shoots a gun into
an occupied house might only be reckless, not knowing, as to the risk that death
will result, but he still might be classified as a murderer under this category.
Interestingly enough, the MPC itself recognizes “extreme indifference”
murder, thus departing from its commitment to limit mens rea to the four
categories in the hierarchy. Both the willful blindness doctrine (which the MPC
recognizes only to a limited extent56) and the extreme indifference doctrine suggest
that the cognitive focus of the knowledge/recklessness distinction is too narrow.
These doctrines demonstrate that criminal culpability is not merely a function of
how great a risk an actor believes he is running; it also depends on: (1) why he
believes that he is running only a smaller risk (is he deliberately avoiding greater
knowledge?), and (2) whether his motives and other features of his conduct make
him especially culpable.

54

For some discussions, see Douglas Husak, The Sequential Principle of Relative Culpability, 1
LEGAL THEORY 493 (1995); Alexander, supra note 30; Simons, supra note 8.
55
For some discussions, see DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 125 n.62 (collecting sources). On one
view, willful blindness should be limited to those reckless actors who would act the same way even if
they did possess knowledge. See Michaels, supra note 12, at 995–1002.
56
As noted above, the MPC recognizes a version of this doctrine that is confusingly drafted and
apparently narrower than the version adopted by many courts. The MPC’s requirement that the actor
believe the fact is highly probable is more stringent than the more common requirement that the actor
simply suspect that the fact exists.

2003]

SHOULD MENS REA PROVISIONS BE AMENDED?

197

Just as knowledge is not invariably “worse” than recklessness, recklessness is
not always worse than negligence.57 Here, too, some negligent, inadvertent actors
might act with a state of mind that is as blameworthy and worthy of punishment as
reckless actors who are aware of the risks. Thus, some states have traditionally
used some version of “culpable indifference” as the mens rea of manslaughter,
without requiring conscious awareness of the risk of death.58 Moreover, when an
actor is intoxicated and for that reason is unaware of a relevant risk, he is usually
treated as “constructively” reckless, i.e., he is treated as harshly as a sober actor
who is actually aware of the relevant risk. Even the Model Penal Code, which
generally abhors imputed or constructive mental states, adopts a constructive
recklessness approach to intoxication.59
Perhaps, then, the definition of recklessness should be expanded generally to
include not only actors aware of the relevant risks, but also actors who are
“culpably indifferent” to the resulting harm or the unlawful circumstance. And
this wider criterion could take into account why the actor was unaware of a risk, or
why he discounted the risk and considered it insubstantial. If it is because he is
intoxicated, of course, even the MPC deems him as culpable as a reckless actor.
But one might expand this equivalence beyond intoxication. For example, suppose
he lacked awareness for a different, but similarly culpable, reason—because he
was preoccupied with committing a crime or because he lost his temper?60 On the
other hand, his reason for unawareness might be much more sympathetic: suppose
a driver has just heard about the death of a loved one and thus is in an
understandable state of shock and grief.61
57

See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 116 (1998) (arguing that an
automobile manufacturer which negligently fails to investigate safety risks at all is more culpable
than a manufacturer which investigates the risks but makes an improper trade-off of cost against
safety); DUFF, supra note 52, at 157–73; Horder, supra note 51, at 508; Simons, supra note 51.
58
See Batey, supra note 50, at 379–80; Simons, supra note 8, at 489.
59
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (1985).
60
See Glanville Williams, The Unresolved Problem of Recklessness, 8 LEGAL STUDIES 74, 86
(1988).
61
And, by the same token, some reckless actors perhaps should be considered less culpable, and
no more culpable than negligent actors, if they act for an especially exculpatory motive—such as a
desire to minimize the risk of harm, or to relieve the suffering of another.
Some have suggested that the MPC’s language of conscious “disregard” requires some additional
culpability beyond simply choosing to take the risk in the face of awareness of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk. Thus, Markus Dubber thinks that this language might imply culpable indifference
or acceptance (dolus eventualis), and not the less culpable mens rea of merely acting despite
awareness (mere culpa). DUBBER, supra note 6, at 75. And David Treiman argues that genuine
efforts to minimize a risk can sometimes negate the requisite “disregard,” though it is not clear that
he would apply this analysis when the actor’s efforts succeed in lowering the risk but the actor
recognizes that the residual risk is still substantial. Treiman, supra note 15, at 370–71. Moreover, in
a recent New York case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that because the defendant employer
consulted with city officials and warned workers to avoid a dangerous pressurized water pipe, they
were not guilty of reckless endangerment. “Thus, defendants did not disregard a risk. On the
contrary, they took steps to avert it.” People v. Reagan, 723 N.E.2d 55, 56 (N.Y. 1999).
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On the other hand, employing “culpable indifference” or a similar standard as
a mens rea category creates its own set of problems, both in its aggravated,
“extreme” form, elevating recklessness to knowledge, and in its more modest form,
elevating negligence to recklessness. On its face, the criterion is quite vague, and
would require careful articulation in order to avoid inconsistent and arbitrary
application.62 The willful blindness and extreme indifference murder categories
have proven problematic in this respect. It would be similarly problematic to
expand the definition of recklessness to encompass not just actors who were aware
of the risk but also those who were, say, “unaware of the risk for a seriously
culpable reason.”
Moreover, used loosely, the criterion would permit punishment merely for
bad character, not for acts. For it might justify punishing someone merely for his
disreputable attitude of indifference towards the risk or harm, even if that attitude
did not actually affect his course of conduct. Imagine a driver who negligently
fails to pay attention while backing out of his driveway, and who accidentally runs
over a child. Suppose he responds to the tragedy with laughter or even delight.
His response is morally despicable but hardly the proper basis for criminal
punishment.63
A more radical approach to the MPC hierarchy is to replace it entirely, either
with multiple hierarchies64 or with a single (though complex) mental state.65
However, whatever the intellectual merits66 of these ideas, implementing them in a
revised MPC is not a realistic prospect.
B. The MPC categories: Too cognitive? Too descriptive? Too rigid?
Let us turn to a related set of concerns about the MPC culpability provisions.
First, are the MPC’s categories too cognitive? The recklessness criterion, for
example, which is the default minimum culpability for any element, emphasizes
the actor’s awareness of a risk. As we have seen, however, the focus on
consciousness of a risk is problematic in many cases. The standard is difficult to
62

See Michaels, supra note 12, at 955 (offering his conception of “acceptance” as a solution to
these problems with both willful blindness doctrine and extreme indifference murder doctrine);
Simons, supra note 51; Ferzan, supra note 44, at 624–25; Robin Charlow, Bad Acts in Search of a
Mens Rea: Anatomy of a Rape, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 323–24 (2002).
63
See Simons, supra note 10, at 220–21, 260–67.
64
See Simons, supra note 8, at 465, 476–94 (arguing that the MPC hierarchy should, in
principle, be replaced by two hierarchies (of “belief-states” and “desire-states”) plus a third hierarchy
of more or less faulty “conduct”).
65
See Alexander, supra note 30, at 944 (arguing for a single, sliding-scale standard of
“insufficient concern”).
66
Or demerits. For criticism of Simons’ approach, see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Don't
Abandon the Model Penal Code Yet! Thinking Through Simons’ Rethinking, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
185 (2002). For criticism of Alexander’s approach, see Dressler, supra note 30. I have heard, from
good authority, that Professor Simons plans to respond to Ferzan’s criticisms in the near future.
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apply. Moreover, if a person lacks awareness of a risk only because he doesn’t
care at all about it, we might conclude that he is as culpable as one who is aware
but makes efforts to avoid or minimize the risk (efforts that are grossly
inadequate).67 Similarly, the negligence test is essentially defined negatively, in
terms of risks of which the actor should have been aware. But sometimes, it is
useful to employ a concept of negligence that focuses more on highly deficient
skill than on culpable inadvertence.68
Second, are the MPC’s categories too descriptive? Perhaps the culpability
provisions should be more thoroughly and explicitly evaluative, requiring the trier
of fact to make a direct moral judgment about the wrongfulness of the conduct.
(Traditional mens rea categories often embodied this more explicitly evaluative
approach.69)
The MPC’s current provisions are a mix of descriptive and more evaluative
criteria.70 Purpose and knowledge are fully descriptive. The “conscious . . . of a
substantial risk” component of the recklessness criterion is descriptive, while the
“unjustifiable” risk and “gross deviation” language are evaluative. Negligence is a
fully evaluative criterion, as is “extreme indifference” murder (except insofar as
that criterion also requires recklessness).71
But should the MPC tilt more in the evaluative direction? For example,
should the general definition of recklessness expand to include inadvertent actors if
those actors are inadvertent “only for a seriously culpable reason (including, but
not limited to, intoxication)”? Such a reorientation would bring both advantages
and disadvantages. The disadvantages—and the concomitant benefits of a more
descriptive approach—include the following: descriptive criteria are usually easier
to apply; the jury applying them is less likely to import its own values; and the
evaluative dimension can still be adequately expressed by manipulating actus reus
67

Compare a merely negligent babysitter who makes no effort to check whether a baby is safe,
and thus lacks awareness of any risk to the baby’s health, with a reckless babysitter who
unreasonably decides to leave the baby unattended on the bed for a minute while she helps another
child. Is the first babysitter really less culpable than the second?
68
See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. Similarly, the MPC employs a sanitized,
cognitive version of willful blindness, as we have seen. Unlike the common law, the MPC pays no
explicit attention to whether the actor’s reason for possessing a mental state less than knowledge is
culpable.
69
See Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the
Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635 (1993); Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45
HARV. L. REV. 974 (1932).
70
See Alan C. Michaels, “Rationales” of Criminal Law Then and Now: For a Judgmental
Descriptivism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 54, 64–66 (2000); PILLSBURY, supra note 42, at 83–86.
71
See MPC Commentaries, supra note 3, § 210.2, at 22:
Whether recklessness is so extreme that it demonstrates similar indifference
[to that displayed by purposeful or knowing homicide] is not a question . . . that
can be further clarified. It must be left directly to the trier of fact under
instructions which make it clear that recklessness that can fairly be assimilated to
purpose or knowledge should be treated as murder.
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elements. (Thus, instead of “extreme indifference” murder being defined as
causation of death when the actor possesses that explicitly evaluative mental state,
a similar category of murder might be defined as causing death as a result of
purposefully causing harm or risk of harm to another, or as a result of knowing use
of a deadly weapon.)
The advantages of the more evaluative approach, relative to a more
descriptive approach, include greater honesty (at least, if one believes that the main
purpose of employing one mens rea standard rather than another is to assess
culpability); a closer fit between the judgments made under the evaluative criterion
and the policies that the criterion is intended to serve or express;72 and a greater
reliance on the community’s judgment of the seriousness of the defendant’s wrong,
insofar as the evaluative criteria explicitly call for such a judgment.73
Third, are the MPC’s criteria too rigid? The predominant MPC approach is
an insistence that the legislature define substantive criminal law criteria (including
mens rea criteria) very clearly, once and for all, at least until the legislature decides
to amend the law. This approach is consistent with the general policy of legislative
crime definition and fair notice to potential offenders.
But do we lose something with this approach? Should we avoid an overly
rigid, predefined set of mens rea criteria? Should courts play a larger role in
interpreting and refining these criteria over time? Would this afford the benefits of
sensitivity to factually changing contexts, and responsiveness to changing
values?74
On the other hand, the legality concerns here are quite serious. Criminal
defendants deserve fair warning of the criteria that will be applied, especially when
the effect on the quantum of punishment can be enormous. (For example, the
decision whether the actor who causes a death displays “recklessness plus extreme
indifference” or merely recklessness marks the distinction between murder and
manslaughter.75)

72

Of course, it is also the case that the more vague the evaluative criterion, the more difficulty a
fact-finder will have applying it accurately, i.e., in a way that furthers or expresses the policies
underlying it.
73
See Simons, supra note 26, at 315–17.
74
For an affirmative response to these questions, see George Fletcher, Dogmas of the Model
Penal Code, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3 (1998). For more negative responses, see Paul Robinson, In
Defense of the Model Penal Code: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 25 (1998);
Batey, supra note 50; and Michaels, supra note 70 (arguing for “judgmental descriptivism,” under
which the fact-finder applies a clear descriptive criterion that nonetheless performs the function of
expressing a judgment of moral blameworthiness).
75
The Commentaries to the MPC criticize the traditional “malice aforethought” approach for
permitting an excessive judicial power to redefine the scope of homicide. MPC Commentaries, supra
note 3, § 210.2 at 14. The MPC’s own criterion of extreme indifference murder avoids this problem,
but only at the cost of leaving extraordinary discretion with the jury. See MPC Commentaries, supra
note 71.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A skeptic might ask: “So what?76 Is improving the MPC’s mens rea criteria
really so important?” I close with two different responses.
A. Mens Rea versus Actus Reus
The first response is to agree, in part, with the skeptic. It is indeed worth
considering whether mens rea is really the foundational, critically important
element of substantive criminal law that criminal law scholars usually assume it to
be. The question is a relative one: How important is mens rea relative to actus
reus in a given jurisdiction’s criminal code? And in an ideal code, how important
would it be?
Do we in the academy overstate the relative importance of mens rea? After
all, legislators normally pay much more attention to actus reus elements when they
create new crimes, and (often) even when they differentiate degrees of a crime.
For example, rape and sexual assault crimes have recently received a great
deal of legislative attention. But the debate is mainly over what the law should
require in the way of force, or threats of harm or disadvantage, or incapacities in
the victim, or expressions of nonconsent, and not over what mens rea should be
required.77
Moreover, in the grading of different degrees of a crime, it is rare for a crime
to use all mens rea categories—or even more than two.78 Indeed, often only one
mens rea category is employed, and the grading is accomplished according to
objective actus reus criteria, such as harm done, or the amount of drugs possessed,
or the status of the individual who was assaulted, deceived or bribed.79
To be sure, mental state distinctions are crucial in differentiating degrees of
homicide. But homicide is an unusual crime in this respect. In assuming that mens
rea is critically important in criminal law, we might forget that homicide is the
only crime whose grades are differentiated solely according to variations in mens
rea. And even in homicide, the role of mens rea is not as dominant as first
appears. Thus, consider the legislative criteria for determining which murders
76

Or, as my children would put the question: “And your point is . . . ?”
Some commentators have endorsed differentiating degrees of sexual assault according to the
actor’s mens rea. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 284 (1998). But legislatures and courts have not been
terribly receptive to this approach. Increasingly, it seems, courts either narrow the types of mistakes
as to nonconsent that are recognized as defenses, or simply impose strict liability. See Joshua
Dressler, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going: Some Cautionary Reflections on
Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 409, 430–39 (1998). And in many jurisdictions, it is even
difficult to determine what mens rea is currently required. See Charlow, supra note 62, at 272–82.
78
See Husak, supra note 54, at 503–04.
79
The criminal legislation of most states is replete with such differentiations. See Singer, supra
note 27, at 183–87.
77
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shall receive the death penalty. Many of the aggravating factors that states specify
are not mental states.80 Moreover, felony-murder, which usually requires no
explicit mens rea as to death, is still very much alive. And, although the doctrine
has been restricted in many states, the restrictions often take the form of causal or
other actus reus limits, not mens rea limits.81
The upshot? We would benefit greatly from a systematic analysis of the
culpability structure of the special part of the criminal law, and of the various types
and degrees of social harm. In analyzing the different types of theft, or of sexual
assault, or of corporate fraud, how can we best explain and justify grading
distinctions, holding constant the actor’s state of mind? I do not imagine that a
structure as straightforward and hierarchical as the MPC’s four mental states will
suffice, for at least two reasons. First, at the normative level, neither retributivists
nor utilitarians are likely to reach easy agreement among themselves (much less
between themselves) on the seriousness of various social harms.82 Second, at the
pragmatic level, it is a political reality that legislatures feel the need to respond
immediately when the public becomes upset about a sensational criminal incident
or about a perceived upsurge in any type of criminal activity. These responses
invariably take the form either of adding new actus reus elements to existing
crimes, or of creating new crimes with new actus reus elements. (Only very rarely
does this political reaction result in modification of a mens rea element.83) But the
responses are often short-sighted and haphazard, and they tend to undermine any
classificatory order within the special part that recodification might have initially
achieved.84
Nevertheless, at the very least, codifiers should follow the lead of the MPC’s
special part and systematize the categories of offenses into distinct groups of

80

Such non-mental state factors often include the victim’s status (very young; elderly; police or
correctional officer); the offender’s status as an inmate; previous conviction of specified crimes; and
whether the killing occurred in the course of a specified felony.
81
See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 519–26; see also Guyora Binder, Felony Murder and Mens
Rea Default Rules: A Study in Statutory Interpretation, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 399 (2000) (noting
that most states with MPC-based codes have ignored the possibility that as a result of their default
mens rea requirements of negligence or recklessness, their felony-murder provisions might no longer
be so strict).
82
To be sure, neither the retributivist nor the utilitarian camp has achieved unanimity about
mental states either, but they have achieved a semblance of agreement.
83
For an example of this unusual situation, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 181 (legislatively
overruling a judicial opinion that narrowly interpreted the “malice” required for murder). Another
example is the legislative movement to restrict the insanity defense following the John Hinckley
verdict.
84
Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill, in their article in this issue, point out, and appropriately
criticize, the tendency of state criminal codes to grow “barnacles” over time that conceal whatever
simple, logical shape the special part might have had when modern codification first took effect.
Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States From
Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 172 (2003).
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related crimes.85 More ambitiously, they might address a deeper question about
the structure of criminal culpability: Is culpability better expressed by multiplying
and refining mental state categories while simplifying and reducing the number of
actus reus elements, or instead by moving in the opposite direction, i.e.,
simplifying mental state categories and multiplying actus reus terms?86
B. Mens Rea and politics
The second observation is that clarifying and improving the MPC’s mens rea
categories, helpful as it would be, will not address the most important problems
with the contemporary state of substantive criminal law. Criminal punishments are
frequently overly harsh: examples include three strikes laws; high penalties for
even minor drug offenses; inflexible, high minimum penalties in many other
categories; and significant punishment for even minor participants in criminal
activities and enterprises. It is easy to draw the pessimistic conclusion that a
model code drafted by the American Law Institute has no hope of countering the
powerful bipartisan political imperative to “get tough on crime.” Indeed, when we
examine more closely the results in states that looked to the MPC in recodifying
their criminal codes, it is clear that some of the MPC’s aspirations to mitigate the
excessive punitiveness of criminal legislation have not been met. For example, the
felony murder rule is still widely enforced; more generally, strict liability continues
to be quite prevalent, notwithstanding the MPC’s strong disapproval; and
negligence rather than recklessness is often the default mens rea requirement.
Could a Model Penal Code Second ameliorate these problems? Stronger
medicine than a revised model criminal code will be needed to cure the more
serious diseases afflicting criminal legislation today—such as undue legislative
focus on harm relative to culpability, and overly harsh punishment for drug crimes,
repeat offenders, and minor participants. (Donald Dripps’ proposed supermajority
and sunset requirements for criminal legislation87 are the type of therapy needed
here.)
But a revised Code could address some of the problems. Consider the
widespread use of strict liability. One response is to reiterate, in emphatic terms,
the MPC’s opposition to this form of criminal liability. Another, perhaps more
realistic, response would be to permit quasi-strict liability but always allow a

85

See Stuart P. Green, Prototype Theory and the Classification of Offenses in a Revised Model
Penal Code: A General Approach to the Special Part, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 301 (2000); see also
Ronald Gainer, The Culpability Provisions of the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 575, 589–91
(1988).
86
For some preliminary thoughts on this question, see Kenneth W. Simons, When is Strict
Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1093–95 (1997) and Simons, supra
note 51, at 393–97.
87
Donald A. Dripps, The Liberal Critique of the Harm Principle, 17 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3
(1998).
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reasonableness defense;88 or to permit strict liability in grading but not in
criminalization;89 or to insist that the actor must at least be aware of facts that
would put him on notice of the dangerousness of his conduct and of the possible
precautions he could take.
Moreover, another aspect of strict liability deserves reconsideration. The
increasing criminalization of conduct formerly governed only by private law and
civil regulation has made it increasingly unfair to expect all persons to be aware of
the criminal law, at their peril. A few courts have responded by rejecting strict
criminal liability for mistake of law in at least some categories of cases.90 So it is
time to seriously consider providing a more general excuse to all defendants who
are faultlessly ignorant or mistaken with respect to the criminal law. (New Jersey
has taken this step;91 I am not aware of evidence that the change has been
problematic.)
***
The MPC’s mens rea provisions are a dramatic improvement over prior law.
The definitions are much clearer, and the “element analysis” concept is immensely
powerful and illuminating. But the mens rea provisions might also be viewed as
victims of their own success. Progress is not perfection, and I sense that the
MPC’s enormous advance initially had the effect of stultifying new thought by
American92 courts and academics about this critical dimension of substantive
criminal law. Moreover, courts have encountered difficulty with numerous
concepts including mistake of law, recklessness, willful blindness, and extreme
88
See Laurie Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 CORNELL
L. REV. 401 (1993) (endorsing a general affirmative defense of good faith or non-negligence).
89
Under this approach, strict liability would be permitted as to an element that distinguishes
degrees of a crime (e.g. quantity of drugs possessed or property stolen), but not as to an element that
differentiates whether the conduct is criminal or noncriminal (e.g. whether the actor has violated a
regulatory offense). See Simons, supra note 86, at 1095–1105.
90
Many federal statutes are now interpreted as requiring some degree of knowledge of
illegality. See generally Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of
Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341 (1998); John S. Wiley, Not Guilty by Reason of
Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021 (1999).
91
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-4(c)(3) provides a defense upon clear and convincing proof that the
actor has “diligently pursued all means available to ascertain the meaning and application of the law
of the offense to his conduct and honestly and in good faith concludes his conduct is not an offense in
circumstances in which a law-abiding and prudent person would also so conclude.” One of the two
reported cases discussing this provision does construe it somewhat narrowly. See State v. Guice, 621
A.2d 553, 558 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (suggesting that the defense is difficult to establish if
the defendant has not consulted a lawyer); see also New Jersey v. Pelleteri, 683 A.2d 555 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1996) (finding that very clear statutory language precludes the defense).
92
Outside of the United States, however, mens rea has been a more vital topic of inquiry. The
British literature, in particular, is full of thoughtful analysis of mens rea criteria, including
indifference.
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indifference. More recently, however, a number of commentators have offered
interesting and promising suggestions for reform. As I have tried to show in this
essay, their suggestions and other revisionist proposals deserve serious attention.

